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Introduction 
“It is not best that we should all think alike; it is a difference of opinion that makes horse races.” 
(Mark Twain) 
The debate on immigration is often heated as it triggers instinctual reactions by natives to the 
perceived ‘invasion’ of their physical, social and cultural territories by alien newcomers. This 
brief essay is about the ‘invasion’ of the economic territory. In particular, it focuses on the 
labour market, providing a selective discussion of how in recent years economists in the 
neoclassical tradition have addressed the questions whether and how immigration affects 
natives’ wages and employment levels.2 
The answers to these questions much depend on the role ‘diversity’ is understood to play in a 
market economy. On this point neoclassical economics has straightforward implications 
based on the main tenet of general equilibrium analysis: in a perfectly competitive 
environment without distortions there are gains from trade (in goods/endowments/factors) if 
and only if agents are ‘different’ (in terms of preferences/endowments/technology). Indeed, if 
they were all identical, sharing and valuing everything in the same way, there would be no 
incentive for them to exchange anything and each of them would be an autarkic island. This 
is wittily captured by Mark Twain’s famous quote cited above.   
While defining what the ‘diversity’ of immigrants actually means continues to be a matter of 
endless discussions, applied studies in economics have taken a pragmatic approach building 
on what can be actually measured in the available datasets. In this respect, ‘diversity’ has 
been captured through aggregate indices based on objectively observable markers (such as 
ethnicity, language spoken at home or country of birth), which may affect individual 
economic outcomes beyond standard labour market attributes (such as educational attainment 
or working experience). A variety of alternative indices has been proposed with the aim of 
capturing both the ‘richness’ and the ‘evenness’ of the immigrant population. The former 
concept broadly refers to the number of identifiable immigrant groups while the latter 
concerns the relative number of their members.3 The basic idea is to relate the chosen 
diversity index to the economic performance of natives in places exposed to immigration.  
A general issue is that unfortunately, even from the narrow economics viewpoint of the 
labour market, immigration remains a complex multi-faceted phenomenon. In particular, 
immigration is the outcome of an endogenous location choice by mobile workers, driven by 
economic and noneconomic reasons, that causes economic and non-economic responses by 
firms and other workers both in the place of origin and in the place of destination. This essay 
focuses on a specific methodological approach that cuts through such complexity by studying 
the labour market responses in the places of destination when immigration can be considered 
an ‘exogenous shock’ driven by noneconomic reasons, to which firms and native workers 
react by entering and exiting the local labour market.  
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The basic analytical framework is laid out in the first section after the introduction. It is 
extended in the second section to highlight some potential ‘identification’ problems that are 
relevant for empirical investigation and their possible solutions. The corresponding empirical 
findings are surveyed in the third section where the importance of different dimensions of 
‘diversity’ between natives and immigrants is also discussed. The fourth section debates the 
issue of how to distinguish a causal impact of immigration on native labour market outcomes 
from a correlation between them. The last section concludes.        
Immigrants and wages 
At the core of the specific methodological approach discussed here is the textbook version of 
the neoclassical equilibrium of a local labour market with full employment. This is depicted 
in Figure 1 with the solid labour demand curve (‘D-curve’) and the solid labour supply curve 
(‘S-curve’) respectively representing the wage local firms are willing to pay and the wage 
local workers are willing to accept for an additional hour of work at each level of 
employment. The D-curve is downward sloping because, when the wage increases, firms are 
willing to hire fewer workers. The S-curve is, instead, upward sloping because, as the wage 
increases, workers are willing to offer more hours. The market is in equilibrium when it 
‘clears’: at the going wage, firms demand exactly the number of hours offered by workers 
and, vice versa, workers offer exactly the number of hours demanded by firms. This happens 
at the crossing between the D-curve and the S-curve, corresponding to wage w0 and 
employment L0. Since for the equilibrium wage there are no workers that would like to work 
more hours than they do, there is no (involuntary) unemployment. Moreover, since for the 
equilibrium wage there are no firms that would like to hire more hours than they do, there are 
no vacancies.  
The D-curve shifts rightwards (leftwards) when labour productivity increases (decreases), as 
firms are willing to hire more (fewer) workers at any given wage. The S-curve moves 
rightwards (leftwards) when the number of workers increases (decreases), as there are more 
(fewer) workers willing to work at any given wage. Hence, if immigration does not affect 
firm productivity, and natives and immigrants are identical in all attributes relevant for the 
labour market, by increasing the number of local workers immigration causes a rightward 
shift of the S-curve while leaving the D-curve unaltered. In Figure 1 the result of this shift is 
depicted by the dashed upward sloping curve corresponding to the new S-curve. The new 
equilibrium at the crossing between the D-curve and the new S-curve exhibits higher 
employment L1> L0 and lower wage w1< w0. Accordingly, if the labour market characteristics 
of immigrants and natives are the same, immigration increases overall employment but 
depresses the wage, as lower wage is needed to convince firms to absorb the additional 
supply of labour. This is the direct ‘displacement effect’ of immigration on native workers.4  
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But the labour market characteristics of immigrants and natives need not be the same due to 
education, experience or culture heterogeneity. In this case, as firms do not perceive the two 
types of workers as perfectly substitutable, two parallel diagrams like Figure 1 become 
relevant, one for immigrants and one for natives, as the two types of workers effectively 
operate in two distinct, though interconnected, labour markets. These parallel diagrams are 
represented in Figure 2. The upper panel (a) shows the impact of newcomers on pre-existent 
immigrants under the assumption that they share the same characteristics and thus are 
perfectly substitutable in production. Just like Figure 1, this panel describes a displacement 
effect that increases immigrants’ employment but reduces their wage: M1> M0 and w1< w0. 
The lower panel (b) refers, instead, to natives. There are two scenarios. In the first, under the 
assumption that immigrants foster native productivity, immigration makes firms willing to 
pay a higher native wage than before for all levels of native employment. This is captured by 
the rightwards shift of the D-curve to its new dashed position, leading to both higher native 
employment and higher native wage: N1> N0 and w1> w0. In the second scenario, under the 
assumption that immigrants rather hamper native productivity, immigration makes firms 
willing to pay a lower native wage for all levels of employment. This is captured by the 
leftwards shift of the D-curve to its new dashed position, which leads to both lower native 
employment and lower native wage: N2< N0 and w2< w0. Whether the immigrant inflow shifts 
the native D-curve (‘productivity effect’) and, if so, in which direction are key research 
questions of the empirical studies on the impact of immigration on natives’ labour market 
outcomes. Answering these questions, however, faces two types of problems, concerning the 
‘identification’ of the specific channels through which immigration and native performance 
interact, and the assessment of the causal impact of the former on the latter.    
Identification issues when native workers relocate 
When the native S-curve does not move as in Figure 2, looking at the change in native wage 
is enough to understand whether immigrants foster, hamper or do not affect native 
productivity. This is the case whenever native workers do not react to immigration by 
relocating. When instead they do react, the change in their wage on its own can be 
uninformative.  
Figure 3 presents two scenarios. In panel (a) immigrants and natives are identical as in Figure 
1. The initial equilibrium wage w0 in the location of interest is equal to the one offered in
alternative locations, so natives have no incentive to relocate. For exposition, it is useful to 
distinguish between the short and the long run effects of immigration. In the ‘short run’ 
native workers are considered immobile. Then, as in Figure 1, immigration shifts the S-curve 
rightwards leading to lower wage w1< w0. In the ‘long run’ natives can relocate. Hence, faced 
with a wage that, due to immigration, has become lower than in alternative locations, native 
workers start to leave causing the S-curve to backtrack. Their outflow goes on until the S-
curve goes back to its initial position where remaining natives have no incentive to relocate 
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as the wage is again equal to w0. In the end, the native wage has not changed but this does not 
mean that immigration has had no effect on natives’ outcomes. Indeed, as also employment 
has not changed from its initial level L0, it must be that each hour of work now supplied by an 
immigrant had been previously supplied by a native.5 Displacement is still at work but is not 
revealed by the change in the wage. Observing no departure of the native wage from its pre-
immigration level w0 is, in fact, consistent with two very different stories: immigrants do not 
affect natives’ labour market outcomes, or they actually replace them one to one. In other 
words, these two stories are ‘observationally equivalent’.  
A second scenario in which wage changes are uninformative when natives relocate is shown 
in panel (b) of Figure 3. The panel depicts the equilibrium in the native labour market when 
immigrants and natives have different characteristics (so it corresponds to panel (b) in Figure 
2). Moreover, it considers a situation in which immigrants affect not only native productivity 
but also their quality of life. This implies that immigration shifts not only the D-curve but 
also the S-curve. Specifically, panel (b) of Figure 3 describes an example in which 
immigration increases native productivity (positive ‘productivity effect’) but also reduces 
native quality of life (negative ‘amenity effect’). Improved native productivity shifts the D-
curve rightwards to its new dashed position. Holding the S-curve constant, this leads to higher 
equilibrium wage w1. Worsened native quality of life shifts, instead, the S-curve leftwards to 
its own new dashed position as, for any level of employment, natives now require a higher 
wage to be convinced not to leave. Holding the D-curve constant, this shift also leads to the 
same higher equilibrium wage w1. Hence, an observed native wage increase to w1 from its 
pre-immigration level w0 is again consistent with two very different stories: immigration 
improves natives’ productivity, or it actually worsens their quality of life. Also these two 
stories are ‘observationally equivalent’. 
To summarize, in both scenarios depicted in Figure 3 observational equivalence generates an 
‘identification’ issue: it is impossible to identify the exact impact of immigration on natives’ 
labour market outcomes by looking only at natives’ wage. 
A way to circumvent these ‘identification’ issues is to focus on situations on which natives’ 
relocation is quite unlikely. This is typically the case at the national level as natives can be 
generally expected not to react to immigration by leaving their own country. For example, in 
panel (a) of Figure 3, taking the entire country as the spatial unit of analysis would prevent 
the corresponding S-curve from backtracking; in panel (b) it would prevent the corresponding 
S-curve from moving around. As a result, any increase (decrease) in native wage could be 
read as an increase (decrease) in native productivity. This ‘aggregate’ approach, estimating 
the effects of immigration using national level data, has been heralded by Borjas (2003) and 
Borjas and Katz (2007). More recently, among others it has been adopted also by Borjas, 
Grogger and Hanson (2012), Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) as well as 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012).      
When, instead, the analysis is performed at a finer spatial level than the whole country, 
natives’ relocation cannot be ruled out. In this case ‘identification’ can be achieved by 
complementing the observation of the change of the local native wage with parallel 
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information on the change of the local native employment. To see this, consider Figure 4, 
which builds on panel (b) of Figure 3. As already discussed, in this scenario the native wage 
increase from w0 to w1 may be equivalently driven by higher native productivity (positive 
‘productivity effect’) or by worse native quality of life (negative ‘amenity effect’). In these 
two cases, however, Figure 4 shows that the reactions of native employment are opposite: the 
positive ‘productivity effect’ comes together with the increase of native employment from L0 
to L1 whereas the negative ‘amenity effect’ comes together with its decrease from L0 to L1’. 
The reason is that higher local productivity attracts natives from other locations whereas 
worse quality of life pushes them away. This suggests that keeping track of not only wage but 
also employment reactions can help solve the identification problem. 
More generally, Figure 4 shows how to identify the dominant effect of immigration when 
both the D-curve and the S-curve may move due to native relocation. If the new equilibrium 
at the crossing of the new D-curve and the new S-curve happens inside the white quadrants, 
the shift of the D-curve (and hence the ‘productivity effect’) must dominate. For the new 
equilibrium to be in the top-right white quadrant, the D-curve must have shifted rightwards, 
thus implying a positive ‘productivity effect’. The opposite holds if the new equilibrium falls 
in the bottom-left white quadrant (negative ‘productivity effect’). Differently, when the new 
D-curve and the new S-curve cross, instead, inside the grey quadrants, the shift of the S-
curve, and hence the ‘amenity effect’, must dominate. For the new equilibrium to be in the 
top-left grey quadrant, the S-curve must have shifted leftwards, thus implying a negative 
‘amenity effect’. The opposite holds if the new equilibrium falls in the bottom-right grey 
quadrant (positive ‘amenity effect’).  
Hence, when immigration is associated with higher (lower) native employment and higher 
(lower) native wage, this is consistent with a positive (negative) productivity effect. When 
immigration is associated with higher (lower) native employment but lower (higher) native 
wage, this is consistent with a positive (negative) amenity effect. This identification strategy 
builds on Roback (1982) and has been adopted by Ottaviano and Peri (2005 and 2006) in 
order to estimate the effects of immigration using urban level data.6      
Dimensions of diversity 
An important implication of the previous discussions is that whether or not natives and 
immigrants are identical in terms of labour market characteristics is crucial. A first distinction 
concerns differences in education and experience (see e.g. Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 
2007; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2012). The idea is that natives can be directly displaced 
only by immigrants with equivalent education and experience as only workers with identical 
characteristics compete head-to-head for the same jobs. Accordingly, the displacement 
argument behind Figure 1 should apply only to the case of immigrant and native workers 
within the same ‘education-experience cell’.    
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A second distinction concerns any further relevant difference in ‘culture’ between immigrants 
and natives with equivalent education and experience (see e.g. Manacorda, Manning and 
Wadsworth, 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). The idea here is that immigrants and natives 
may differ in some culture related characteristics that make then imperfectly substitutable in 
production even though they share equivalent education and experience. From this 
perspective, the displacement argument behind Figure 1 should apply only within the same 
‘education-experience-culture cell’. In this respect, the most commonly used markers of 
‘culture’ at the individual level are language spoken at home, ethnicity and country of birth.  
The common result of studies on national data is that heterogeneity in education and 
experience matters as native workers are only found to suffer from a direct ‘displacement 
effect’ associated with immigrants with equivalent education and experience (i.e. the D-curve 
is downward sloping). On the other hand, they are also found to benefit indirectly from a 
positive ‘productivity effect’ associated with the inflow of immigrants with different 
education and experience (i.e. the D-curve shifts rightwards). Moreover, Manacorda, 
Manning and Wadsworth (2012) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find that also heterogeneity 
in country of birth is important as immigrants and natives with equivalent education and 
experience are still imperfectly substitutable in production, and this dampens the 
displacement effect.7 Overall, considering the actual characteristics of natives and immigrants 
in the countries analysed, national studies conclude that there is little evidence of diffuse 
damages for native workers from immigration. For example, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find 
that immigration into the US from 1990 to 2006 is associated with a small increase in native 
wages not only on average but also individually, at least for the vast majority of native 
workers.         
This evidence of a relevant ‘productivity effect’ of immigration is confirmed by studies based 
on urban data. In these studies individual cultural markers are typically aggregated at the city 
level through some ‘diversity index’ to provide a unidimensional aggregate measure of local 
‘cultural’ diversity.8 The index is then correlated with local native wage and employment so 
as to check whether across cities different degrees of cultural diversity are associated with 
any of the quadrants in Figure 4. Ottaviano and Peri (2005 and 2006) find evidence of a 
dominant positive ‘productivity effect’ of immigration for natives living in US metropolitan 
areas where diversity increased between 1970 and 1990, respectively measuring diversity in 
terms of country of birth and language spoken at home.   
Causation and reverse causation  
Showing that native labour market outcomes are positively correlated with immigration, and 
that this is associated with an underlying positive correlation between native productivity and 
immigrants, does not necessarily imply that immigration causes higher native productivity. 
Causation may actually run in the opposite direction whenever some other feature makes a 
location more productive and thus more attractive to both native and immigrant workers 
(‘boomtown effect’).  
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A way to attenuate the possible relevance of such ‘reverse causation’ is to look at ‘natural 
experiment’ that closely fit the concept of an exogenous increase in the supply of immigrants 
to a given labour market. A famous example of ‘natural experiment’ is the study by Card 
(1990) of the labour market of Miami after the Mariel Boatlift, that is, after the arrival in 
1980 of 125,000 Cuban immigrants following Fidel Castro’s declaration on April 20th 1980 
that Cubans wishing to do so were free to emigrate to the US from the Cuban port of Mariel. 
This resulted in a 7 percent increase in Miami’s labour force as between 50 and 60 percent of 
the boatlifted decided to stay in Miami. Two features of this exodus are appealing in terms of 
‘exogeneity’. On the one hand, reportedly refugees largely consisted of undesirables who 
were pushed out of Cuba (‘exogenous push’). On the other hand, they disproportionately 
settled in Miami rather than elsewhere in the US due to the presence of a relatively large local 
community of previous Cuban immigrants (‘exogenous pull’). The analysis of Card (1990) 
focuses on the direct ‘displacement effect’ for pre-existent less-skilled workers. Even though 
most of the boatlifted were relatively unskilled, he finds virtually no effect of the Mariel 
influx on the wage and employment of non-Cuban less-skilled workers in Miami from 1979 
to 1985.9 
The interpretation of these results, however, has been questioned based on the ‘identification’ 
issue presented in panel (a) of Figure 3 (see e.g. Autor, 2003). For example, it has been noted 
that after the boatlift the population growth rate slowed down much more in Miami than in 
the rest of Florida, possibly suggesting that natives and older immigrants were deterred from 
migrating to Miami. According to the logic of panel (a) of Figure 3, such response could have 
muted the ‘displacement effect’. More fundamentally, the study of the Mariel Boatlift, as all 
natural experiments, faces the challenge of generalization. Autor (2003) points out that 
Miami was extremely well set up to absorb Cuban immigrants due to its established Cuban 
employment and social networks, to its occupational structure and its long experience in 
accommodating Cuban immigration. 
An alternative standard strategy to solve the problem of reverse causation is to use 
econometric techniques to separate the exogenous component of immigration from the 
endogenous one driven by the ‘boomtown effect’. The idea is to find substitute actual local 
immigration with some ‘instrumental variable’ correlated with it but not with local 
productivity. In their studies of the impact of cultural diversity in US cities from 1970 to 
1990, Ottaviano and Peri (2005 and 2006) ‘instrument’ the exogenous component of 
immigration in two ways. First, they use the distances of each city from the international 
border, from the coast, and from the closest main ‘gateway’ into the US (i.e. New York, Los 
Angeles or Miami). The underlying idea is that, in the period of observation, immigrants 
came to the US for reasons exogenous to the local events of any particular city and, due to 
pre-existent immigrant communities, tended to settle disproportionately close to their points 
of entry into the US. Hence, simply by geographic accident and not because of local 
productivity shocks, cities closer to the coast, the border or the main gateways received larger 
immigrant inflows.  
The second way to proxy the exogenous component of immigration borrows the so-called 
‘shift-share’ methodology from Card (1999). This alternative ‘instrumental variable’ is 
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constructed by grouping foreign-born workers according to language spoken at home 
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2005) or country of birth (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006) and calculating the 
initial share of each group in each city in 1970. A group in a city is then imputed the growth 
experienced at the national level (due to immigration) from 1970 to 1990 according to its 
initial share in the city in 1970. This gives an ‘imputed’ change in the size of each group in 
any given city that does not depend on the actual immigration of that group in that city after 
1970. For example, a city with a large initial Mexican-born population in 1970 would be 
‘imputed’ a large share of Mexican immigrants in 1990 independently of whether and how 
the city actually attracted them. The idea is that using the initial local shares of immigrant 
groups in 1970 together with the national immigration trends for those groups from 1970 to 
1990 should insulate the ‘imputed’ changes in a city from any city-specific productivity 
shocks, as long as the initial presence of a given group of immigrants makes the city 
attractive to newcomers of the same group independently of any productivity advantage. 
Both ‘instrumental variables’ lead to the same conclusion: from 1970 to 1990 immigration 
caused a positive ‘productivity effect’ on natives in US cities, associated with higher native 
wage and higher native employment.10 
Conclusion 
Observing how the local wage of native workers changes after an inflow of immigrants can 
be uninformative of the actual impact of immigration on the local labour market. The reason 
is that the actual composition of the natives’ workforce and the actual composition of the 
immigrants’ inflow, as well as their tastes, matter a great deal. Natives are harmed by the 
competition of immigrants with equivalent skills as their services become relatively more 
abundant, hence less valuable (negative ‘displacement effect’). But they may benefit from the 
inflow of immigrants with different skills as their services become relatively scarcer, hence 
more valuable (positive ‘productivity effect’).  
At the same time, cultural differences between immigrants and natives may raise barriers to 
effective interactions in the workplace, turning the ‘productivity effect’ from positive to 
negative. But cultural differences may also generate a positive or negative ‘amenity effect’ as 
natives may simply like or dislike having immigrants around. On the one hand, cultural 
diversity may give rise to conflicts of preferences, barriers to communication, outright 
racism, prejudice or fear of other groups, leading to a sub-optimal provision of private and 
public goods.11 On the other hand, it can generate benefits in terms of the variety of goods, 
services and skills available for consumption and production.12 By pooling different skills, 
abilities and solutions, cultural diversity can also help creativity and innovation.13        
Whether the ‘displacement effect’ and the ‘productivity effect’ of immigration on natives 
have any practical relevance, whether they are positive or negative, and which eventually 
dominates are then empirical issues. The studies discussed in this essay provide evidence of a 
negative ‘displacement effect’ and a positive ‘productivity effect’, with the latter dominating 
10 
for the average native worker as well as for the majority of native skill groups in the countries 
analysed.         
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Figure 1 - The effects of immigration when natives and immigrants are identical 
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Figure 2 - The effects of immigration when natives and immigrants are different 
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(a) Natives’ relocation when natives and immigrants are identical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Natives’ relocation when natives and immigrants are different 
 
Figure 3 – Identification problems when natives relocate 
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Figure 4 – Identification strategy when natives relocate 
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Endnotes 
1 Paper prepared for the book “The History of Migration in Europe - Perspectives from economics, politics and 
sociology”, F. Fauri (ed.), Routledge explorations in economic history, edited by L. Magnusson, Vol. 71, Taylor 
and Francis, Abingdon. 
2 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Okkerse (2008) and Pekkala Kerr and Kerr (2011) for recent surveys; 
Borjas (1994) and Friedberg and Hunt (1995) for overviews of the earlier literature. 
3 See e.g. Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani (2003) for a survey of alternative diversity indices. 
4 When, differently from the textbook neoclassical model, the wage cannot adjust (for example, because of 
labour market institutions), the displacement effect materializes in higher unemployment rather than lower wage 
(D’Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri, 2010). 
5 This is sometimes called the ‘skating rink mobility model’, whereby each immigrant who skates into an area 
knocks one native off the ice. See Autor (2003) who attributes the labelling to David Card. 
6 Ottaviano and Peri (2005) follow the exact identification procedure described in Figure 4. Closer to Roback 
(1982), Ottaviano and Peri (2006) use land rent instead of employment to complement wage information. The 
two procedures follow the same logic and are mutually consistent.   
7 Other recent studies finding imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives with equivalent 
education and experience include Card (2007) and Raphael and Smolensky (2008) for the US as well as 
D’Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2010) for Germany. 
8  See e.g. Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani (2003) for a discussion of alternative indices. 
9 Other examples of ‘natural experiments’ include Carrington and de Lima (1996) on repatriations from Africa 
to Portugal in the 1970s and Friedberg (2001) on immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel in the early 1990s. 
10 Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Prarolo (2013) reach comparable conclusions in the case of European regions. 
11 See e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004). 
12 See e.g. Lazear (1999 a, b), O’Reilly, Williams and Barsade (1998) and Kahane, Longley and Simmons 
(2013). 
13 See e.g. Berliant and Fujita (2008) and Florida (2002 a, b). 
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